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1 Introduction
Evolutionary accounts of the innovation process have argued that systems of
innovation facilitate the diffusion of new knowledge throughout the economy
(Freeman, 1987). Systems of innovation (sectoral, regional, national) require
the presence of dynamic links between their different actors (firms, financial in-
stitutions, research/education, public sector funds, intermediary institutions),
as well as horizontal links within organizations and institutions (Freeman,
1995).
The role that the public sector and private firms play in a complex and com-
petitive technological landscape has been only partially explored. Innovation
policies may under-perform if agents play the wrong role in the wrong part of
the technological landscape (in time and space). For example, recent evidence
from the OECD suggests that private venture capitalists take the lead in in-
vesting in emerging technologies, with respect to government funded venture
capitalists (Breschi et al., 2018),1 whereas public investment leads the Research
of R&D in the early and most risky stage of new industries (Comins, 2015).
For instance, in biotechnology, nanotechnology and telecommunications, the
private financing of innovation arrived two decades after the most important
investments were made by public sector funds.
In hindsight, history shows that those areas of the risk landscape (within
sectors at any point in time, or at the start of new sectors) that are defined
by high capital intensity and high technological and market risk have required
great amounts of public sector funding (of different types), as well as public
sector vision and leadership to get them off the ground (Mazzucato, 2013).
A more comprehensive understanding of the risks associated to developing
new technologies gives credit to the role of the public sector in innovative
activities. Central to this understanding is the need to better identify how the
division of innovative labour maps into a public-private division of rewards. A
critical point is defining the relation between those who bear risk in contributing
to the innovation process and those who appropriate rewards from it. Doing
so makes it immediately logical for there to be a more collective distribution of
the rewards, proportional to the risks taken.
The present report aims to explore the relationship between innovation per-
formance and distributional outcomes by comparing different types of innova-
tion ‘eco-systems’, defined by the asymmetric public/private role in financing
1Such as drones, virtual reality, artificial intelligence, apps, 3D printing, blockchain, and cloud computing
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innovation and the associated complexity of the new technology introduced into
the economy.
We build on Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013), who introduce a Risk-Reward
Nexus framework to study the relationship between the extent of risk taking
and profit sharing across different actors throughout the innovation chain. And
we extend the agent-based simulation model in Wirkierman et al. (2018), which
advances a set of metrics to quantify key aspects of the Risk-Reward Nexus.
After this brief introduction, the rest of the report is organised as follows.
Section 2 motivates the use of the notion ‘innovation eco-system’, whereas
section 3 discusses some general features of our simulation model. Then, section
4 defines the innovation ‘eco-systems’ as seen through the lens of the model,
and relates them to narratives of actual innovation processes. In section 5
we present results of simulation exercises and discuss the emerging patterns.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Innovation eco-systems
The literature on public support to innovation has focused mainly on innovation
policies based on R&D subsidies, and their role in crowding out or augmenting
firms’ innovative activities. Results are mixed (Dimos and Pugh, 2016; Petrin,
2018), with some studies finding that public intervention does not increase
firms’ investment in R&D (Radicic and Pugh, 2016), and others that find a
significant additionality (Dechezlepreˆtre et al., 2016).
In this report we focus on directed public intervention in research, and the
role of public sector in fostering innovation, through its impact on the market,
and on firms’ capabilities to explore complex technological landscapes.
Within the context of our analysis, we consider an innovation ‘eco-system’ as
the (multi-layered) interconnected array of agents and institutional mechanisms
behind processes of technological and market competition for the development
of a new technology through innovation.2
By referring to innovation systems as ‘eco-systems’, we aim to explicitly
distinguish the symbiotic from the parasitic nature of the relationship between
public and private agents throughout the innovation chain, in analogy with the
motivations and implications of such terms within an ecological framework.
In a symbiotic relationship, each agent provides for the other the conditions
2The term innovation ‘eco-system’ is not universally accepted nor unambiguously defined by scholars within
the Innovation Studies tradition. See Oh et al. (2016) for a critical view.
3
required for their mutual continued existence, the ultimate implication of it
being that agents depend on each other equally. Instead, in a parasitic rela-
tionship, an agent takes advantage of another agent (of a different type) feed-
ing from it, resulting in a deep asymmetry that weakens the latter, ultimately
threatening their mutual existence.
How can we be sure that the innovation eco-system is one that results in
a symbiotic relationship between the public and private sector rather than a
parasitic one? That is, will increased investments by the State in the innovation
eco-system cause the private sector to invest less, and use its retained earnings
to fund short-term profits, or more, in R&D expenditure?
Usually a question like this might be discussed in terms of conflicting views
about the ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis: whether State investment uses up savings
that could have been used by the private sector for its own investment plans
(Friedman, 1979), as opposed to the idea that the economy is hardly ever under
a situation of full resource utilisation in which the trade-off between public and
private investment holds. As mentioned, results from the literature on R&D
subsidies are mixed (Dimos and Pugh, 2016; Petrin, 2018), whereas results from
the venture capital literature suggest that there is little evidence of crowding
out (Breschi et al., 2018).
However, by focusing exclusively on discussing the crowding-out hypothesis,
we insufficiently acknowledge the fact that the State invests in areas that the
private sector would not invest even if it had the resources. Firm-level studies
have shown that what drives entry behaviour into industries are not existing
profits in that sector but projected technological and market opportunities
(Dosi et al., 1997). And such opportunities may be linked to the amount of
State investment in research in those areas.
Policymakers may not be ambitious enough to demand that such support be
part of a more collaborative effort in which the private sector also steps up to
the challenge. And in this way we risk allowing a symbiotic innovation system,
in which the State and private sector mutually benefit, to transform into a
parasitic one in which the private sector is able to leach benefits from a State
that it simultaneously refuses to finance.
In this report we discuss three varieties of innovation eco-systems, which cru-
cially differ in the public/private distribution of risk taking and profit sharing
across the innovation chain. We codify these differences into the evolutionary
agent-based simulation model introduced in Wirkierman et al. (2018), adapt-
ing it to cope with alternative institutional mechanisms defining asymmetric
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roles for public/private agents in the financing of innovation. The trajectories
obtained from the model represent a stylised (and approximate) depiction of
(selected features of) actual processes of technological and market competition
in the development of a new technology.
3 The model
To study the relationship between an innovation process and the distribution
of risks and rewards – under alternative ‘eco-systems’ – we use an agent-based
simulation model of technological competition. Across configurations, there
are two agent types: A (public sector) and B (private firms). There is one
instance of type-A and nB(t) instances of type-B, indexed as i = 1, 2, . . . , nB(t)
for each time period t.3 In this section, we only present selected equations
portraying key aspects of the model. Full details of its specification can be
found in Wirkierman et al. (2018).
3.1 Performance: Technology, demand and competition
In our framework, technology is represented by the fitness landscape of a
pseudo-NK model (Valente, 2014): a multi-peaked surface with a unique global
peak, which represents the dominant design (Klepper, 1996) of a new technol-
ogy (see Figure 1, for an example).
Figure 1: Example of two-dimensional fitness landscape (adapted from Valente,
2014, p. 117)
3The number of private firms nB(t) changes through time.
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Each dimension in the landscape represents a component of a new technology
being introduced into the economy. Technology components may be mutually
dependent on each other. Within this framework, the complexity of the innova-
tion process consists in the degree of connection between each pair of technology
components. For any given couple of dimensions j and k, ajk represents the
degree to which component j depends on component k, and this degree ranges
from 0 (complete independence) to 1 (maximum interdependence). A high de-
gree of interdependence between dimensions j and k means that a movement
along dimension j, for different values of k, changes the impact of dimension j
on fitness from negative (positive) to positive (negative).4
Every agent (the public sector and each private firm) explores the landscape
at each time-period, and each position (e.g. (x1, x2) in Figure 1) has a fitness
score associated to it (the value on the vertical axis associated to (x1, x2) in
Figure 1). This fitness score αi(t) represents the product quality reached by
the agent at time t.
Given the ‘rugged’ nature of the landscape, throughout this gradual and local
search process agents risk facing a lock-in problem: moving to a contiguous
landscape position in every dimension may not lead to any increase in fitness
at a local level (e.g. the local peak in Figure 1). If this is the case, the flow of
resources used to explore the landscape does not lead to any improvement in
product quality.
This new technology is used in a new industry producing a final product. We
assume that demand increases with the quality of the product. The size of the
market, i.e. total final demand F (t), is functionally related to average product
quality by a logistic curve (reflecting non-linearity and saturation effects):5
F (t) =
100
1 + e−φ1(φ2α(t)−φ3)
(1)
where aggregate product quality is given by the average (across all agents)
contribution to fitness of the technology landscape, α(t).
Final demand addressed to each firm f i(t) is a share θi(t) in total final
4In Figure 1, this means that the effect on fitness of a movement along the X1 axis can change sign depending
on the contingent value of the X2 axis, and vice-versa.
5Parameters (φ1, φ2, φ3) govern the shape of the curve. In our implementation, (φ1, φ2, φ3) = (0.35, 50, 35).
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demand F (t):
f i(t) = θi(t)F (t), such that
nB(t)∑
i=1
f i(t) = F (t) (2)
where θi(t) is the market share of the i-th. firm at time t.
The evolution of market shares θi(t) is determined by a replicator equation
(Metcalfe, 1998), which crucially depends on the extent to which the product
quality of a firm, αi(t), is above/below the (lagged) average for type-B agents,
αB(t− 1):
θi(t) = θi(t− 1)
(
1 + χ
αi(t)− αB(t− 1)
αB(t− 1)
)
(3)
where χ is the intensity of replicator dynamics, αi(t) is the product quality of
the product of the i-th. firm at time t, and αB(t − 1) is the (lagged) average
product quality across nB(t− 1) firms at time t− 1.
Besides the dynamics implied by (3), the model has three mechanisms that
foster intense market competition:6
1. The initial position on the technological landscape of an entrant is drawn
from a uniform distribution continuously changing, with an upper limit
given by the current position of the incumbent with highest fitness (which
includes the public sector) plus a stochastic factor;7
2. Entrants rip a slice of the market share of the biggest incumbent. Initially,
the entrant is appealing due to the sense of novelty it entails. A share
of consumers is not aware of the quality difference between the leading
incumbent and the entrant until they try the latter’s product;
3. Incumbents with particularly high market shares reduce their re-investment
in R&D out of profits, therefore slowing down landscape exploration in
relation to more dynamic entrants.
In terms of entry and exit rules, new firms enter landscape exploration and
production at a constant rate. As an exit rule, if the firm’s market share falls
6Analytical details may be found in Wirkierman et al. (2018, pp. 9-10).
7This implies that entrants are more likely to lag behind the incumbents (including the state), and will need
to invest in R&D to catch-up and leapfrog. Nut in exceptional cases new firms may enter with a slightly
higher fitness than incumbents. This is because, technology may not be easily imitated, and a period of
learning is required from the investment, to be able to advance.
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below a given minimum threshold, it exits the market (Marsili, 2001). To mon-
itor market concentration in the industry at each time period, the Herfindahl
Index is computed:
H(t) =
nB(t)∑
i=1
θi(t)2 (4)
Finally, to quantify the resilience of firms operating in the market, we com-
pute a failure rate, given by the number of firms that lasted for, at most, two
periods (before exiting the industry) over the total number of firms that ever
entered the industry.
3.2 Inequality: the Risk-Reward Nexus
So far, only aspects related to technological and market competition have been
explored. We now turn to income relations, i.e. distributive aspects. Final
demand equals the balance of primary income in this simplified economy, which
is divided into profits ΠB(t), wages W (t) and the government surplus piA(t):
F (t) = W (t) + ΠB(t) + piA(t) (5)
We assume that R&D investment from both the public sector and private
firms consists in labour costs, i.e. wages paid to specialised R&D workers who
perform research and applied development of new products.8 Formally, we
have:
W (t) = RDA(t) +
nB(t)∑
i=1
RDi(t) (6)
where RDA(t) is public investment in R&D and RDi(t) is firm i investment in
R&D.
The value created within each firm by means of quality improvements results
in income generation when profits pii(t) are realised through sales f i(t), net
of R&D expenditure for technological exploration RDi(t), taxes on revenues
τf i(t), the payment to the public sector of a license to access the new technology
ciA(t) or the receipt of a grant h
i
A(t) to explore the fitness landscape and further
8In the US, the share of labour costs in total intramural R&D spending by the sector of business enterprises has
risen from 46% (average 1981-1985) to 66% (average 2009-2013), source: OECD Dataset on Gross Domestic
Expenditure on R&D by sector of performance and type of cost.
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improve the final product:
pii(t) = (1− τ)f i(t) + hiA(t)−RDi(t)− ciA(t) (7)
The public sector spends RDA(t) in R&D to explore the technology land-
scape, supports technological exploration of some private firms by providing
grants hiA(t), receives income from the license for operating the new technology
that some firms pay ciA(t), and collects taxes from firms’ sales. As a result,
government surplus piA(t) is given by:
piA(t) =
nB(t)∑
i=1
τf i(t) +
nLicB (t)∑
i=1
ciA(t)−
nGrB (t)∑
i=1
hiA(t)−RDA(t) (8)
where nLicB (t) is the number of firms that pay the license cost to the public
sector and nGrB (t) is the number of firms that receive a grant, during period t.
Adopting the measure of risk taking and profit sharing introduced in Wirkier-
man et al. (2018), the Risk-Reward Nexus of agent i is given by:
RRN i(T i) =
Reward
Risk
=
µi(T i)
σi(T i)
=
1/T i
∑T i
t=0 pi
i(t)
(1− αi(0))(αi(T i)− αi(0)) (9)
where pii(t) are the profits of the agent at time t, αi(t) is landscape fitness score
at time t, and T i is the exit time of agent i from the market.
In (9), while the meaning of the numerator is self-explanatory (profits or gov-
ernment surplus represent a time-averaged measure of reward), the measure of
risk in the denominator is the product of: (i) the initial distance to the domi-
nant design (1 − αi(0)) and (ii) the length (in terms of fitness improvements)
of the path explored (αi(T i)− αi(0)). Intuitively, agents that invested early in
the technology will begin from a distant position to the dominant design (low
αi(0)), implying a higher risk. Moreover, conditional on its initial position, the
more an agent has explored the more risk it has faced throughout the process
(larger (αi(T i)− αi(0))).
The process of technological and market competition embedded in the model
– together with the institutional mechanisms of the innovation eco-system –
may generate (in different ways) an imbalance between risks (represented by
the distance from the dominant design of the new technology and the length of
landscape explored) and rewards (represented by profitability). The measure
of Risk-Reward Nexus in (9) allows us to quantify the extent of this imbalance
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throughout alternative scenarios of the model.
4 Innovation eco-systems within the simulation model:
gestation, licensing and grants
In a nutshell, the intuition of the model introduced in section 3 runs as follows.
After being allocated an initial random position on the technological land-
scape, agents locally explore the landscape to improve the fitness score, which
represents the quality of the final product. The size of the market (i.e. indus-
try demand) increases with average product quality, whereas product quality
differentials determine the change in market shares. A higher market share
implies higher revenues, which drive R&D investment to execute further steps
in the exploration of the technology landscape, obtaining a new fitness score,
associated to a better product quality: a new loop has begun. This cumulative
process repeats itself, and may lead to virtuous or vicious circles, both in terms
of innovation diffusion (i.e. market size) and inequality (i.e. imbalance between
risks and rewards).
In this context, we consider three different innovation eco-systems, labelled:
(i) Gestation, (ii) Licensing and (iii) Grants.
4.1 Gestation
The technology life-cycle associated to the final product of an industry consists
of three stages: gestation, vital life and maturity. The gestation phase of
the life-cycle is the riskiest: due to the low product quality and small market
size, private firms may have little incentives to start exploring the technology
landscape.
Thus, we assume that exploration in this initial phase of an industry is trig-
gered by the public sector. Only after the public agent reaches a fitness such
that the market size attains a minimum threshold, private firms start to ex-
plore the technology landscape. In this way, R&D performed by the public
sector during the gestation period fuels knowledge accumulation that will be
later exploited by private firms.
Under the ‘gestation’ innovation eco-system, the knowledge generated by the
State at the gestation stage of the life-cycle is available to all private firms, once
they start exploring the landscape and producing the final product. But, at that
point, it is only up to private agents to increase average product quality in the
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industry, leading to a market expansion. The public sector no longer actively
engages in R&D expenditure (and landscape exploration).9 This institutional
arrangement has, at least, two implications. First, the initial effort made by
the public agent might not be fully compensated by taxation at more advanced
stages of the technology life-cycle. Second, once market competition is in place,
the knowledge available to a late entrant might be rather limited in comparison
to the distance from the dominant design reached by leading incumbents.
In terms of equations (7) and (8) of the model, this eco-system implies that:
pii(t) = (1− τ)f i(t)−RDi(t)
piA(t) =
nB(t)∑
i=1
τf i(t)−RDA(t)
i.e. the only public/private redistribution mechanism is taxation of firms’ rev-
enues.
In the simulation exercises of section 5, this eco-system is used as a bench-
mark : after the gestation stage of the technology life-cycle, innovation invest-
ment relies exclusively on private finance. Instead, in the two alternative in-
novation eco-systems discussed below, there is a more active role of the public
sector throughout the innovation chain.
4.2 Licensing
A first alternative to the ‘gestation’ eco-system is represented by the ‘licensing’
innovation eco-system. Under this institutional arrangement, the public sector
directly invests in R&D throughout the innovation chain, charging a license fee
to firms who want to access their accumulated technological knowledge. Private
firms may take advantage of the privileged landscape position reached by the
public sector, acquiring the license to operate the new technology and obtaining
a relatively high fitness score in the technology landscape, product quality and
market share, since entry, thus accessing innovation surplus profits. These
profits are channeled as dividends, whereas investment in R&D contributes to
the development of skills of R&D workers, increasing wages.
Firms that pay the license fee to access accumulated knowledge by the public
sector not only have an initial advantageous landscape position, but also in the
9Recalling that we refer to the specific technology used to produce the final product of the industry considered.
It is assumed that the public sector moves towards a new technology landscape to start a different exploration
process.
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event of a technological lock-in (i.e. when by moving locally in any direction of
the landscape they cannot increase their fitness) a fee payment allows them to
move to the current position of the public sector.10 Given that the public sector
in this eco-system is actively engaged – throughout the life-cycle – in direct
R&D expenditure and landscape exploration to close the gap with respect to
the dominant design, by paying the license fee some private firms can make a
non-local jump, exiting the lock-in situation and rekindling exploration from a
different area in the landscape. This allows them to avoid stagnation in their
product quality which may lead to decreases in their market share when other
firms find a more promising path to technological improvement.
Thus, under the ‘licensing’ eco-system, if a private firm that does not pay the
license to the public sector faces a lock-in, its R&D expenditure will produce
no further increases in product quality, and it will probably be overtaken by
firms that that pay a license, or do not fall in lock-ins (e.g. entrants that have
a license advantage to access the current state of the new technology).
In terms of equations (7) and (8) of the model, this eco-system implies that:
pii(t) = (1− τ)f i(t)−RDi(t)− ciA(t)
piA(t) =
nB(t)∑
i=1
τf i(t) +
nLicB (t)∑
i=1
ciA(t)−RDA(t)
i.e. there are two public/private redistribution mechanisms: taxation of firms’
revenues (τf i(t)) and license fees to access the current state of accumulated
knowledge by the public sector (ciA(t)).
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4.3 Grants
A third alternative is represented by the ‘grants’ innovation eco-system. Under
this institutional arrangement, the public sector directly invests in R&D only
during the gestation phase of the life-cycle. Once the State reaches a fitness
score such that the market size attains a minimum threshold, private firms start
to explore the technology landscape. Randomly, entrants might be selected to
participate in a grant scheme offered by the public sector. If this is the case,
10We assume that private firms cannot make ‘jumps’ across the landscape, and have therefore a higher propen-
sity to lock-in in local optima. Instead, the public actor can invest large amounts of resources in risky
research, therefore moving to completely unknown part of the landscape, making ‘jumps’.
11Analytical details on the determination of the license fee paid by private firms may be found in Wirkierman
et al. (2018, pp. 12-3).
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knowledge previously accumulated by the public sector is rendered available to
grantees, who are also financially supported by the State to expand landscape
exploration further.
Differently from the ‘licensing’ eco-system (and similarly to the ‘gestation’
eco-system), the public sector is only engaged in direct R&D expenditure at the
early stage of the technology life-cycle. Then, it is up to private firms to achieve
higher product quality by progressively closing the gap with the dominant
design. However, differently from the ‘gestation’ eco-system (and similarly
to the ‘licensing’ eco-system), the public sector continues to support private
firms after the gestation phase: the State explores the technology landscape
indirectly, by allocating grants to private agents.
The total expenditure in R&D by the public sector is distributed between
direct exploration (during the gestation phase) and grants (after gestation). As
an allocation rule, grants provided by the public sector are distributed inversely
proportional to the firm’s market share. In principle, such an allocation rule
encourages a catching-up process for entrants. However, the public sector fi-
nances its grants by means of previously accumulated surplus. Thus, if a higher
diversification of grant allocation slows down market size expansion (due to the
multiplicity of decentralised efforts to explore the technology landscape), rev-
enue taxation may be stagnant and, even though grants would be more equally
distributed, the absolute amount of resources perceived by some grantees may
decline. These are the nuances of a steady pattern of grant expenditure with a
dynamic allocation rule.
In terms of equations (7) and (8) of the model, this eco-system implies that:
pii(t) = (1− τ)f i(t) + hiA(t)−RDi(t)
piA(t) =
nB(t)∑
i=1
τf i(t)−
nGrB (t)∑
i=1
hiA(t)−RDA(t)
i.e. there are two public/private redistribution mechanisms: taxation of firms’
revenues (τf i(t)) and grants allocated by the public sector to private firms in
order to explore the technology landscape (hiA(t)).
4.4 Innovation eco-systems as narratives behind actual innovation processes
The institutional arrangements defining each eco-system previously described
are an apparent simplification of the complexity behind innovation episodes
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throughout history. This notwithstanding, the stylised eco-systems within the
simulation model have been conceived with reference to some aspects of actual
innovation processes.
The pharmaceutical industry is a first interesting case in point. Large pharma,
small biotech, universities and government labs are all parts of the eco-system.
Government labs and government-backed universities focus on the research
responsible for producing the most radical new drugs. Private pharma has
focused more on ‘me too’ drugs (slight variations of existing ones) and the
development (including clinical trials) and marketing side of the business.
It is an industry in which scientific knowledge plays a central role and is
only partly appropriable. Part of the knowledge that is used to produce new
drugs is generated by and/or based on publicly funded scientific research, and
in principle freely accessible. Thus, by accessing publicly funded research done
during the gestation stages of drug development, pharmaceutical companies are
at least partly “subsidised” when they step into the process of technological
exploration. For example, the development of the biotech industry in the US is
a direct product of the key role of the government in leading the development of
the knowledge base that has provided firm success and the overall growth of the
industry (Mazzucato, 2013). These considerations suggest that the ‘gestation’
eco-system might capture some features of the technology life-cycles associated
to pharmaceutical innovation.
However, we must be wary of the fact that the pharmaceutical industry has
experienced radical transformations in the last decades, since the end of its
‘golden age’ (form the second post-war period up to the 1980s). Health sys-
tems at the height of the welfare state era implied sustained public financing
of health-related research, exploited by private actors (Orsenigo et al., 2006).
Within this context, the emerging dominance of “big pharma” changed innova-
tion models. Many large pharma companies downsized – or closed altogether
– R&D labs moving towards an ‘open’ model of innovation that outsources –
to small biotech firms or public labs – most of their research-intensive tasks
(Gambardella, 1995).
Features of the ‘licensing’ eco-system may be connected to the development
of some of Apple’s iPhone components (Mazzucato, 2013, ch. 5).12 One of the
key recent features in iPhone models is the virtual personal assistant known as
SIRI.13
12Within this context, a ‘license fee’ is broadly intended as a generic label for an institutional device that allows
the public sector to commercialise a technology it has developed.
13SIRI is an artificial intelligence platform combining natural language processing, statistical learning and a
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As with many other key technological features in Apple’s iOS products, SIRI
has its roots in federal funding and research. In 2000, under request of the US
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Stanford Research
Institute (SRI) was put in charge of coordinating the ‘Cognitive Assistant that
Learns and Organizes’ (CALO) project which included 20 universities all over
the US collaborating to develop the necessary technology base. When the
iPhone was launched in 2007, SRI recognised the opportunity for CALO as
a smartphone application and then commercialised the technology by forming
‘SIRI’ as a venture-backed start-up in the same year. In 2010, SIRI was acquired
by Apple.
Finally, it may be argued that the development of Photovoltaic (PV, here-
inafter) solar panels in the US has some features of the ‘grants’ innovation
eco-system. The first major opportunities for solar PV technology were cre-
ated by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and the US National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which purchased solar cells
made by the US-based Hoffman Electronics Corporation to power space satel-
lites. Currently, there are several modern governmental initiatives helping to
establish leading solar PV firms, but it is interesting to trace back the origin
of many innovative emerging firms in the US that managed to develop state-
of-the-art technologies.
We consider four examples of industry firms (First Solar, Solyndra, Sun-
power, Evergreen) with apparent public support to the private exploration of
the technology landscape, following the gestation phase of the solar PV panels
life-cycle.
First Solar’s patents have ‘extensive links’ to prior US Department of En-
ergy (DoE) research (Ruegg and Thomas, 2011, p. 4-11), and early develop-
ment of First Solar’s leading technology was a result of close collaboration with
State-funded solar research facilities, university scientists and the US National
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Solyndra developed innovative tech-
nology with state and federal support, building on previous national research
conducted on thin-film solar cells. The success of SunPower, a leading manufac-
turer of high performance solar PV panels, ties back to DoE research patents,
in this case related to solar PV shingles, module frames and shingle systems
(Ruegg and Thomas, 2011). In fact, SunPower had early R&D support from
the DoE and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) while developing
technology at Stanford University. Finally, Evergreen Solar grew with the aid
family of web search algorithms.
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of the government, attracting USD 60 mln. in state subsidies.
The proposed analogies between innovation eco-systems within the simula-
tion model (‘gestation’, ‘licensing’ and ‘grants’) and actual processes of techno-
logical change (within the pharmaceutical industry, Apple’s iPhone components
and solar PV panels, respectively) represent an effort to bridge the theoretical
account of industry dynamics captured by a Risk-Reward Nexus framework
and concrete examples of innovation trajectories. As such, these analogies can-
not (and are not intended to) mirror historical episodes comprehensively. They
simply represent a preliminary device to appraise and map simulation results
to categories and orders of magnitude found in actual industries.
5 Simulation results
The model discussed in sections 3 and 4 cannot be solved analytically due to
the non-linearities implicit in its specification. In view of this, a discrete-time
simulation platform has been used to codify and implement it.14 Parametric
configurations for three alternative innovation eco-systems subject to different
technological complexity have been devised, performing extensive randomiza-
tions for each of them, in order to control for across-simulation variability.
We report below across-run averages over 50 replications for each scenario
considered and within-scenario correlation matrices, in order to uncover both
statistical first moments and significant co-movements.
In what follows, after a brief characterisation of alternative scenarios and
metrics computed, we (statistically) compare simulation outcomes and interre-
lationships between innovation performance and inequality across scenarios.
5.1 Alternative scenarios
We analyse six scenarios that depend on two dimensions: (i) the innovation
eco-system and (ii) the complexity of the new technology introduced (medium
vs. high complexity) – the higher the complexity, the more difficult it is to
improve the quality of the product and the more likely it is to fall in a lock-in,
for a given investment in R&D; returns to investment are consequently lower.
In particular, scenarios are defined as follows:
1. Gestation public R&D scheme and medium tech-complexity:
14All simulations have been programmed using the Laboratory for Simulation Development (LSD). For more
information see https://github.com/marcov64/Lsd.
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(benchmark scenario)
The public sector is involved in the process of technological exploration
by directly investing in R&D only at early stages of the innovation chain
(i.e. gestation), whereas it is only up to private firms to further improve
product quality, in a context in which the intensity of interdependence
between components of the new technology (i.e. dimensions of the fitness
landscape) is of medium complexity. Within this eco-system, once de-
mand is sufficient for private firms to enter the industry, the public sector
lets innovation development be driven by the private firms.
2. Licensing R&D scheme and medium tech-complexity:
The public sector is involved in the process of technological exploration
by directly investing in R&D throughout the innovation chain, and pri-
vate firms pay a license fee to access the accumulated knowledge stock
and the position of the public investor on the technological landscape,
in a context of medium complexity of the new technology. Within this
eco-system, once demand is sufficient for private firms to enter the indus-
try, the public sector lets them access the accumulated knowledge stock,
and their position on the technological landscape, by paying a license fee.
Those who do, start technological exploration from a relatively advanta-
geous position.
3. Grants R&D scheme and medium tech-complexity:
The public sector is involved in the process of technological exploration
by directly investing in R&D only at early stages of the innovation chain
(i.e. gestation), supporting private firms through grants to further develop
the product’s quality, in a context of medium complexity of the new
technology. Within this eco-system, once demand is sufficient for private
firms to enter the industry, the public sector supports further innovation
development by allocating grants for technological exploration to private
firms.
4. Gestation public R&D, high tech-complexity:
Public-private roles are the same as those under eco-system 1, but in
a context in which the complexity of the new technology is high (the
contribution to fitness of movements in one landscape direction heavily
depends on the relative position in other dimensions of the landscape).
5. Licensing R&D scheme, high tech-complexity:
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Public-private roles are the same as those under eco-system 2, in a context
of high complexity of the new technology.
6. Grants R&D scheme, high tech-complexity:
Public-private roles are the same as those under eco-system 3, in a context
of high complexity of the new technology.
While section 4 has explained in detail the difference between innovation eco-
systems, the differing complexity of the new technology (medium/high) intends
to capture alternative levels of risk of the environment in which agents operate.
In scenarios of medium technological complexity lock-in episodes are less fre-
quent due to a lower ‘ruggedness’ of the technology landscape. This reduces the
level of aggregate risk for all agents exploring the technological landscape, all
things being equal. On the contrary, in scenarios of high technological complex-
ity, the likelihood of facing lock-in and halting technological advances is higher,
increasing aggregate risk, cœteris paribus. In fact, firms who cannot make a
jump to an entirely different area of the technological landscape, will eventually
be overtaken by entrants who take pathways leading to higher product quality,
and exit the market.
Table 1 reports a summary of the scenarios just described, to ease under-
standing and for later reference throughout the analysis of results.
Table 1: Simulation scenarios
Tech-Complexity Eco-system Scenario
Medium
Gestation 1
Licensing 2
Grants 3
High
Gestation 4
Licensing 5
Grants 6
Table 2 reports model parameters that appear in equations (1)-(9).15
From Table 2 we see that the complexity of the technology stems from the
value of parameter aij. The higher aij, the higher is the dependence of each
technological component on the position in other components, to assess the
15A more complete parameter list can be found in Wirkierman et al. (2018, p. 21).
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Table 2: Across-scenarios and scenario-specific parameters
Parameter Description Tech-Complexity Range Value
Complexity of the technology: pseudo-NK landscape
N Landscape dimensions Both ≥ 2 2
aij Intensity of interaction Medium [0, 1] 0.35
High [0, 1] 0.60
Competition regime
χ Intensity of replicator dynamics Both [0, 1] 0.50
Public policy
τ Tax rate on sales Both [0, 1] 0.10
Simulation steps = 150; entrants per entry-period = 2; entry interval = 4.
relative contribution to fitness. A higher value of aij increases the ruggedness
of the technology landscape. In our scenarios with medium complexity of the
technology (scenarios 1, 2, 3), aij = a = 0.35, whereas in those with high
complexity (scenarios 4, 5, 6), aij = a = 0.65.
5.2 Metrics
In order to compare alternative scenarios we compute a set of metrics for each
run of the simulation model, enumerated in Table 3.
Table 3: Simulation metrics: specification of indicators computed
(Time period T represents the simulation step in which the dominant design has been reached by one of the private firms)
Indicator Formula Reference Eqs.
Industry Structure
and Innovation
Performance
1.1 Final Demand at T F (T ) (1)
1.2 Aggregate Private Risk at T a/αB(T ) (3)
1.3 Herfindahl Index at T
∑nB(T )
i=1 θ
i(T )2 (4)
1.4 Failure rate at T nfailB (T )/nB(T ) —
Inequality and the
Risk-Reward
Nexus
2.1 Wage share in final demand
∑T
t=1W (t)/
∑T
t=1 F (t) (5)
2.2 RRN Private Firms (Reward/Risk) RRN
B
(T ) (9)
2.3 RRN Public Sector (Reward/Risk) RRNA(T ) (9)
2.4 Relative RRN (private/public) RRN
B
(T )/RRNA(T ) (9)
Notes: nfailB (t) represents the number of firms that lasted for two periods at most (before exiting the industry) up to time period
t. Parameter a measures the strength of the dependence of one landscape dimension on the position in other dimensions to assess
the contribution to fitness.
We compare the scenarios considering indicators regarding, crucially, two
dimensions: innovation performance and inequality. In each case indicators
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have been computed as time-averages of accumulated variables up to time-
period T and/or at the values they adopt in T . Time period T represents the
simulation step in which the dominant design has been reached by one of the
private firms.16
The first set of metrics (indicators 1.1-1.4 in Table 3) concerns innovation
performance. In our model, the size of the market is given by industry’s fi-
nal demand F (t) and, being normalised between 0 and 100, it allows to be
interpreted as the percentage of adopters of the product obtained with the new
technology. Thus, indicator 1.1 measures innovation diffusion, which is also a
measure of the fitness of the technology reached by firms (or product quality).
Indicator 1.2 measures aggregate risk for private firms: for a given complex-
ity of the technology (captured by parameter a), aggregate risk associated to
technological exploration will be higher the lower the average fitness score col-
lectively achieved (αB(T )). The Herfindahl Index (indicator 1.3) measures the
degree of market concentration associated to the process of technological com-
petition. In relation to this, the failure rate (indicator 1.4) captures the degree
of unsuccessful investment projects resulting from the collective and uncertain
process of innovation.
The second set of metrics (indicators 2.1-2.4 in Table 3) concerns two di-
mensions of inequality: (i) the share of wages in the distribution of the net
output of the industry (indicator 2.1) and (ii) the private, public and relative
Risk-Reward Nexus (indicators 2.1-2.4).
The extent of inequality associated to investment dynamics is captured by
the wage share in final demand (indicator 2.1), as it proxies the extent of value
extraction: increasing dividends (and profits) slow down R&D investment and
the development of skills by R&D workers.
The Risk-Reward Nexus, instead, quantifies the imbalance between the prof-
its extracted from an innovation process by a given agent type (public/private),
and the associated risks taken to finance innovation (through R&D investment
to explore the technological landscape) for each agent type (public/private).
5.3 Innovation eco-systems: average features
The indicators presented in Table 3 apply to each simulation run for every
alternative scenario. In order compare the scenarios summarised in Table 1, we
16Taking T as the end-period of our analysis is justified by the fact that the key aspects of technological and
market competition are reflected in what happens up to the point when a firm reaches the dominant design.
From that point onwards, it may as well happen that the public sector and private firms move on to develop
another technology (exploring a new fitness landscape).
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compute across-run averages over 50 replications for each of them and report
these averages in Table 4.
Our interest lies in making a statistical comparison between eco-systems (‘ges-
tation’, ‘licensing’ and ‘grants’), given their environment (i.e. medium/high
technological complexity). To assess whether across-run averages are statis-
tically different we perform four Welch’s unequal variances t-test and report
p-values in the corresponding columns of Table 4.17 We take the ‘gestation’
eco-system as our benchmark and, for each risk level, compare average results
obtained for each indicator [1.1]-[2.4] in Table 3.
The table shows that aggregate private risk is mostly dependent on the en-
vironment. This is an expected result: aggregate risk in our model is partially
determined by parameter a, which defines the complexity of the technology.18 It
also depends on the average landscape fitness value, i.e. the collective outcome
of private innovative efforts in the industry. Simulation results suggest that the
former dominates over the latter. This means that, in the model, changing the
public/private institutional arrangement (i.e. switching to another eco-system)
cannot compensate for major differences in the degree of complexity of the new
technology.
Focusing on the scenarios with medium technological complexity, a more
active public policy of landscape exploration (2 & 3) brings about lower con-
centration and failure rates, as well as higher R&D intensity, which is reflected
in a higher wage share in final demand.19
Firms’ risk is also significantly lower when grants and licenses are used – a
result in line with a lower failure rate – and this is because private agents can
build on a continuous public effort to either start landscape exploration from
an advantageous position (‘licensing’) or obtain public support for additional
R&D expenditure (‘grants’).
The public RRN is clearly lower in the ‘licensing’ and ‘grants’ eco-systems
with respect to the ‘gestation’ one, i.e. the public sector faces a higher risk and
lower reward when it intervenes beyond gestation. This is mainly due to the
fact that, in this latter eco-system, the public sector is not actively involved
(directly or indirectly) in R&D expenditure, once it has developed the early-
stage knowledge base.
17The null hypothesis being that means are not statistically different.
18Please see section 3 for details.
19Recall from section 3 that, in our model, R&D investment consists in wages fostering development of skills
by specialised R&D workers.
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Consequently, the ‘gestation’ eco-system has the lowest relative (i.e. pri-
vate/public) RRN, whereas the ‘licensing’ one has the highest value for relative
RRN. Such a high relative RRN in this latter eco-system can be explained
by the higher risk faced by the public sector when it takes the responsibility
of sustaining continuous direct R&D expenditure to ‘technologically bail-out’
firms which get ‘locked-in’ in the process of landscape exploration.
In a nutshell, under an environment of medium technological complexity,
the ‘gestation’ eco-system has a relatively low percentage of adopters (low-
est innovation performance), highest concentration, lowest wage share and
least unbalanced relative RRN. That is, lowest innovation performance, highest
profit/wage gap but lowest private/public RRN imbalance.
In comparison, the ‘licensing’ eco-system has the highest percentage of adopters
(highest innovation performance), lowest concentration and failure rate, high-
est wage share but highest imbalance between private and public RRN. That
is, highest innovation performance, lowest profit/wage gap but highest pri-
vate/public RRN imbalance.
Finally, the ‘grants’ eco-system has similar percentage of adopters, industry
concentration and failure rates to the ‘licensing’ eco-system and an intermediate
imbalance between public and private RRN. That is, high innovation perfor-
mance, relatively low profit/wage gap, and an intermediate private/public RRN
imbalance.
Thus, in applied terms, the setting-up of joint (public/private) research labs,
financed out of public grants (i.e. associated to the ‘grants’ eco-system) – and
which are active throughout the innovation chain – would appear as a desirable
intermediate case (in terms of balancing innovation performance and relative
inequalities), under an environment of medium technological complexity.
Switching to scenarios under an environment of high complexity of the new
technology, statistical differences between eco-systems are less pronounced. The
likelihood of facing technological lock-in is higher, and this element seems to
dominate over the public/private institutional mechanism to push innovation
forward. This notwithstanding, differences especially emerge in relation to our
key synthetic indicator [2.4]: the relative RRN. In this case, both the within-
environment (and between eco-systems) relative ranking and the within-eco-
system (and between environments) orders of magnitude coincide.
This is an interesting result: our relative RRN indicator is capturing both
a regularity across environments and a difference between eco-systems that no
other indicator captures. For different risk levels, the private/public imbalance
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between rewards and risks is highest in the ‘licensing’ scenarios 2 and 5 (where
there is an active, direct R&D involvement of the State throughout the innova-
tion chain), lowest in the ‘gestation’ scenarios 1 and 4 (where the public sector
is only active at an early stage of the life-cycle) and within an intermediate
range in the ‘grants’ scenarios 3 and 6 (where the public sector is also actively
involved after gestation, by indirectly supporting decentralised technological
exploration of private firms).
The different role of innovation eco-systems on firms’ risks and rewards is also
related to the observed market structure, more concentrated in an environment
with lower technological complexity. In such a regime, public intervention after
the gestation phase significantly reduces market concentration: entrants face
lower barriers to innovation, because they can either buy a license (starting
from a landscape position closer to that of the incumbents) or receive a grant
(obtaining public support to accelerate landscape exploration through increased
R&D). With no public intervention, incumbents have cumulatively gained a
technological advantage that new firms are rarely able to catch up with.
However, in a scenario in which the complexity of the technology is high,
(i) market concentration is substantially lower, and (ii) the role of the public
sector in innovation investment after gestation makes no substantial difference.
The first result is explained by the fact that the high complexity makes it
very unlikely for any firm to make continuous advances in product quality.
The public sector, as another actor, although it has the ability to risk more
and make big leaps in landscape exploration, quickly and repetitively falls into
lock-in situations. Then, new entrants’ technology is not so distant from that
of the incumbent. The second result follows: the advantage to exploit the
knowledge accumulated by the State is small, because rarely – in the span of
the simulation runs analysed here – it has the opportunity to make considerable
progress in such a complex landscape.
In addition to the metrics specified in Table 3, Table 4 includes two addi-
tional indicators: the share in profits of licensed firms and the share in taxes of
grantees, each of them specific to the ‘licensing’ and ‘grants’ scenarios, respec-
tively. These are useful to quantify the relative importance of those private
firms that engage in the specific institutional arrangement of each eco-system.
In scenarios under the ‘licensing’ eco-system (2 and 4), firms that pay the
license fee account for (almost) 80% (medium tech. complexity) and 70% (high
tech. complexity) of industry profits; whereas in scenarios under the ‘grants’
eco-system, firms that have received a public grant account for 76% (medium
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tech. complexity) and 66% (high tech. complexity) of public revenues from
taxation. Thus, it can be seen that – under each eco-system and across envi-
ronments – firms involved in private/public institutional arrangements account
for the greatest share of profits and tax revenues.
5.4 Innovation eco-systems: correlated dynamics
In this section we gain further insights on the co-movements across variables.
How is innovation performance related to the Risk-Reward Nexus across eco-
systems? For each scenario we gather the results of 50 simulation runs and
compute the Pearson correlation coefficient for each pair of indicators [1.1]-
[2.4] in Table 3.
Tables 5 and 6 report correlation coefficients for indicators of industry struc-
ture, innovation performance, inequality and RRN, when significant at least at
the 10% level, for medium and high levels of technological complexity, respec-
tively. Moreover, Figure 2 graphically depicts the relationship between selected
indicator pairs across eco-systems, including a fitted simple regression model
in each case.
The first result is that, while most indicators of performance and inequal-
ity are correlated in the ‘gestation’ eco-system (under medium technological
complexity), this is not the case in the other eco-systems. Here we focus on in-
novation performance (proxied by final demand, which measures the percentage
of adopters, i.e. market size), market concentration (proxied by the Herfindahl
Index), the price/wage gap (proxied by the industry wage share), and pri-
vate/public inequality, as captured by the (relative) RRN (i.e. Reward/Risk).
In an environment of high technological complexity, the relation between
innovation diffusion and the wage share is negative across all eco-systems: al-
though all R&D investment in our simplified economy accrues to wages, market
size expansion through innovation generates relatively more profits than wages.
When considering scenarios with medium technological complexity, this nega-
tive relation between the wage share and market size is only statistically sig-
nificant in the ‘gestation’ eco-system, suggesting that the contribution of the
public sector to the innovation process makes this distribution-growth trade-off
less clear-cut: higher innovation performance can be reached without reducing
the wage share in final demand.
Results also suggest that, in the ‘gestation’ eco-system, the consequences of
the (tamed) replicator dynamics embedded in the model become apparent: a
higher market size tends to be associated with a higher concentration index
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Table 5: Correlated dynamics for alternative innovation eco-systems
(Complexity of the new technology: Medium)
(Across-run bilateral correlations statistically significant at the 10% level)
Eco-system: Gestation
Indicator [1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4]
[1.1] Final Demand at T -0.965 0.468 0.298 -0.502 -0.296
[1.2] Aggregate Private Risk at T -0.472 -0.283 0.461
[1.3] Herfindahl Index at T 0.255 -0.690 -0.665 -0.398 -0.313
[1.4] Failure rate at T -0.460 0.284
[2.1] Wage share in Final Demand 0.409 0.269
[2.2] RRN Private Firms 0.612 0.569
[2.3] RRN Public Sector -0.271
[2.4] Relative RRN
Eco-system: Licensing
Indicator [1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4]
[1.1] Final Demand at T -0.943
[1.2] Aggregate Private Risk at T
[1.3] Herfindahl Index at T 0.380 -0.804 -0.405
[1.4] Failure rate at T -0.250
[2.1] Wage share in Final Demand 0.483
[2.2] RRN Private Firms 0.437 0.933
[2.3] RRN Public Sector
[2.4] Relative RRN
Eco-system: Grants
Indicator [1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4]
[1.1] Final Demand at T -0.949
[1.2] Aggregate Private Risk at T 0.286 -0.244
[1.3] Herfindahl Index at T -0.822
[1.4] Failure rate at T
[2.1] Wage share in Final Demand
[2.2] RRN Private Firms 0.327 0.449
[2.3] RRN Public Sector -0.466
[2.4] Relative RRN
and failure rate.20
Moving on to consider co-movements involving RRN (i.e. Reward/Risk) in-
dicators, in a ‘gestation’ eco-system with medium technological complexity,
innovation performance is inversely related to the relative RRN: the higher the
extent to which firms are able to earn more profits relative to their risk exposure
with respect to the public sector, the lower the resulting market size achieved.
20And given the inverse relation between market size and aggregate risk, the higher the latter, the lower the
concentration index and failure rate.
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Table 6: Correlated dynamics for alternative innovation eco-systems
(Complexity of the new technology: High)
(Across-run bilateral correlations statistically significant at the 10% level)
Eco-system: Gestation
Indicator [1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4]
[1.1] Final Demand at T -0.995 0.290 -0.825
[1.2] Aggregate Private Risk at T -0.277 0.825
[1.3] Herfindahl Index at T 0.290 0.259
[1.4] Failure rate at T 0.555
[2.1] Wage share in Final Demand -0.243
[2.2] RRN Private Firms 0.843
[2.3] RRN Public Sector
[2.4] Relative RRN
Eco-system: Licensing
Indicator [1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4]
[1.1] Final Demand at T -0.943 -0.780
[1.2] Aggregate Private Risk at T 0.727
[1.3] Herfindahl Index at T 0.445 -0.274
[1.4] Failure rate at T
[2.1] Wage share in Final Demand
[2.2] RRN Private Firms 0.969
[2.3] RRN Public Sector -0.264
[2.4] Relative RRN
Eco-system: Grants
Indicator [1.1] [1.2] [1.3] [1.4] [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4]
[1.1] Final Demand at T -0.996 -0.308 0.326
[1.2] Aggregate Private Risk at T 0.322 -0.325
[1.3] Herfindahl Index at T 0.276
[1.4] Failure rate at T
[2.1] Wage share in Final Demand -0.409
[2.2] RRN Private Firms 0.262 0.935
[2.3] RRN Public Sector
[2.4] Relative RRN
The fact that this relation is not statistically significant in the other two eco-
systems suggests that public intervention breaks the link between market size
and firms’ ability to reap more profits while investing less.
However, robustly across scenarios, private firms’ RRN is positively related
to the relative (i.e. private/public) RRN. When firms’ gain from relatively
lower risk (for given rewards) – or relatively higher rewards (for given risks)
– they are also in a position to obtain a larger share of rewards relative to
their contribution, when compared to the public sector. Top and bottom right
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Figure 2: Innovation Performance and Inequality between eco-systems
(Complexity of new technology: Medium) (Complexity of new technology: Medium)
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panels of Figure 2, plot this relation for both environments of technological
complexity. It may be seen that, under the ‘grants’ eco-system, firms are able
to increase (decrease) the relative RRN (obtain more rewards than the public
investor, for a given risk) with a smaller increase (decrease) in private RRN
(increase in rewards with respect to risk). In other eco-systems, high relative
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RRN must be accompanied by substantially higher private reward or lower risk.
As noted above, concentration is substantially higher in regimes of medium
technological complexity. Under those regimes, the outcome that is most
strongly related to the industry wage share is market concentration. The more
concentrated the market, the lower the wage share in final demand. As the top-
left panel of Figure 2 shows, the relation is rather similar across the different
eco-systems, although market concentration is higher and the wage share lower
under the ‘gestation’ eco-system. Public investment improves both, at the same
rate. Such a relation is not observed for an environment of high technological
complexity, in which market concentration is relatively low.
In a nutshell, when the public sector is only involved during the gestation
phase of the technology life-cycle (‘gestation’ eco-system), and private firms are
able to reap shares of financial rewards from the innovation process that are
disproportionate to their contributions to the process (i.e. higher private RRN),
higher innovation diffusion (i.e. final demand) is associated with increases in
industry concentration (i.e. higher Herfindahl index) and profit/wage inequality
(i.e. lower wage share in final demand). When, instead, the public sector is more
actively involved throughout the innovation chain (as in the ‘licensing’ and
‘grants’ eco-systems), it is possible to accelerate innovation diffusion without
increasing inequality.
6 Final remarks
The present report has explored some relationships between innovation per-
formance, market structure, profit/wage gap and public/private inequality, by
comparing different types of innovation ‘eco-systems’, in an emerging industry
undergoing a process of technological and market competition. Eco-systems
have been defined by the asymmetric public/private role in financing innova-
tion and the associated complexity of the new technology introduced into the
economy.
Three stylised ‘eco-systems’ have been proposed. In all three of them the
public sector is involved in the process of technological exploration by directly
investing in R&D at early stages of the innovation chain (i.e. gestation phase).
Differences on its role emerge once the potential market size (i.e. technological
opportunities) allows for private firms to enter the market.
Within the first, ‘gestation’ eco-system, it is only up to private firms to fur-
ther finance the innovation process after the gestation phase of the technology
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life-cycle. In the second, ‘licensing’ eco-system, the public sector directly invests
in R&D throughout the innovation chain, and private firms pay a license fee to
access accumulated public knowledge. Finally, in the third, ‘grants’ eco-system
the public sector supports private firms throughout the technology-life cycle
by allocating grants to further (co-)finance innovation. All three eco-systems
have been analysed for alternative complexity levels of the new technology in-
troduced into the economy.
Moreover, we have argued how each stylised eco-system depicted could be
linked to narratives behind actual innovation processes: features of the ‘gesta-
tion’ eco-system may be related to the pharmaceutical industry, those of the
‘licensing’ eco-system have been inspired by the development of some of Ap-
ple’s iPhone components, and the ‘grants’ eco-system could be related to the
development of solar PV panels in the US.
The tool used to numerically explore relationships between innovation and
inequality within this framework has been an agent-based simulation model
introduced in Wirkierman et al. (2018), further augmented and adapted to
contemplate different institutional arrangements and public/private redistribu-
tion mechanisms, as required by each eco-system. Simulation exercises have
focused on better understanding the interplay between innovation diffusion,
the distribution of gains between public and private actors, between industry
profits and wages, and the implications of this for industrial dynamics.
In our assessment of average trends between scenarios, the ‘grants’ eco-system
emerges as one with high innovation diffusion (i.e. market size given by the
percentage of adopters), industry concentration and failure rates similar to the
‘licensing’ eco-system and an intermediate degree of imbalance between risk
taking and profit sharing, when comparing public and private agents. That is,
high innovation performance, relatively low profit/wage gap, and an interme-
diate private/public Reward/Risk imbalance.
Thus, in applied terms, the setting-up of joint (public/private) research labs,
financed out of public grants (i.e. associated to the ‘grants’ eco-system) – and
which are active throughout the innovation chain – would appear as a desirable
intermediate case (in terms of balancing innovation performance and relative
inequalities), under an environment of medium technological complexity.
By comparing co-movements of variables across simulation runs, it emerged
that when the public sector is only involved during the gestation phase of
the technology life-cycle (‘gestation’ eco-system), and private firms are able to
reap shares of financial rewards from the innovation process that are dispro-
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portionate to their contributions to the process (in terms of risk taken), higher
innovation diffusion is associated with increases in industry concentration and
profit/wage inequality. When, instead, the public sector is more actively in-
volved throughout the innovation chain (as in the ‘licensing’ and ‘grants’ eco-
systems), it is possible to accelerate innovation diffusion without increasing
inequality. Ultimately, precisely because innovation is a collective and cumula-
tive process, Reward/Risk imbalances may not only result in greater inequality
but also undermine the innovation process itself.
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